E conomic well-being depends both on the ability of current income and in-kind services to meet consump tion needs and on future income flows, assets, and insurance holdings that can be drawn upon to cover the costs o f uncertain contin gencies. Private insurance can be purchased to cover specific health-care costs, the sudden death of an income earner, or job-related disability. Publicly funded disability, retirement, survivor, and health insurance provides basic protection against those risks to most elderly. Finally, cash and in-kind, means-tested transfers insure that individuals' eco nomic status will fall no further than a minimum floor.
vis-a-vis their health condition and the adequacy of their incomes and assets to meet potential but uninsured exigencies (e.g., severe inflation, long-term-care expenses). Good public and private health insurance and adequate personal savings add to the economic security o f the elderly by insulating them against unfortunate contingencies. On the other hand, inadequate health insurance and undependable income flows, often coupled with poor health and the financial powerlessness to react to such changes, all increase economic insecurity by reducing the ability of the elderly to cope with either expected or unexpected economic change.
The purpose of this article is to explore the chinks in the economic armor of the elderly in the form of economic insecurities against which many of them feel (and actually are) powerless. The first part defines the general conditions that characterize the insecure elderly. The sec ond section outlines the data we will use to explore these insecurities. The third section indicates the separate factors that we consider to be important in determining the economic insecurity of the elderly and how we go about using these factors to define the insecure. The next section of the article presents the results, while the final section sum marizes the findings and discusses their policy implications.
Finding the Insecure Elderly
Recent studies indicate that the elderly as a group are as well or per haps better off on average than are the nonelderly (due largely to the improved money and nonmoney incomes of more recent cohorts of retirees) and that overall elderly poverty rates, while not far above those of younger adults, are far below those of children (Hurd 1989; Preston 1984; Smeeding 1990) . However, there is a much higher percentage of elderly than nonelderly living on incomes between 1.0 and 2.0 times the poverty line (a money income range in 1989 of $5,900 to $11,700 for single persons and $7,500 to $14,900 for couples) (Ruggles 1987) . This income group faces the highest risk of financial insecurity. They are at risk because, without private insurance, their income and assets alone are insufficient for them to withstand a run of economic misfor tune, yet their assets and incomes are too high for them to be pro tected by the means-tested welfare safety net. Smeeding (1986) dubbed these at-hsk individuals "the 'tweeners" to emphasize their positioning between the public and private income security systems.
We identify several sources of economic insecurity; potentially high out-of-pocket bills for acute health care, economic disaster in the form o f long-term-care costs. Social Security as a constraining force on achiev ing Medicaid eligibility, and unexpected inflation in housing costs. In addition to these financial measures of insecurity, we also investigate insecurity due to chronic disabilities that limit normal activities and in crease the potential time and money cost of such activities. To the ex tent that the economically insecure are also physically insecure, they arc in a situation of double jeopardy; the inadequacy of their finann'al re sources is compounded by the additional income needs associated with chronic physical disability.
While any one of the types of financial insecurity may spell disaster, we define the insecure as those meeting two or more of our insecurity conditions. Our major thesis is that disproportionate numbers of the insecure are in the lower-middle-income ranges, those with "welfare ra tios" (ratio o f money incomes plus food stamps to the poverty line) of between 1.0 and 2.0. As we show, insecurity does extend into higher income categories. If the catastrophic events examined here should strike, the insecure in all welfare groups will by definition be unable to finance them for any length of time without reducing other forms of consumption. For example, a higher-income individual may have a physical disability that leads to rejection by private health insurance. Likewise, some elderly families who are just below the poverty line are also insecure because of their ineligibility for means-tested programs. For instance, as many as one-third of the elderly poor may be asset in eligible for means-tested benefits from SSI and Medicaid (Leavitt and Schulz 1988) . We estimate that 40 percent of the poor in our sample are not eligible for SSI, with 22 percent of the poor ineligible on the basis of assets alone. These poor as well will have publicly provided economic security only after their current source of security (i.e., their liquid assets) is depleted. But, as we show, it is the middle-income range in which the insecure are most likely to be found. For these peo ple, nonmoney income in the form of medical care and housing subsi dies could help replace higher cash incomes as a potential source of protection against adverse economic situations, if they so qualified. In actuality, lack of adequate nonmoney income or asset protection for this group places them at risk, and hence, we argue, current private and public insurance policy implicitly imposes the greatest financial in security on this income group.
Data
In order to examine the factors that affect risk status of the elderly, we need data for a nationally representative sample with information on cash and noncash income, on wealth and its composition, on expendi tures for housing (utilities, mortgages, property tax), on medicalinsurance coverage, and on the chronic health status of the elderly.
The data set we use is the 1984 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) database (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1987). This longitudinal panel survey interviewed the members of a nationally representative sample of about 20,000 households. These individuals were interviewed at four-month intervals for about two and one-half years. Basic core demographic, household stmcture, and income data were gathered at each interview and special " topical modules" were ad ministered on a nonrecurring basis. In particular, information from topical modules in waves 3 (health and disability) and 4 (assets, shelter costs, energy usage) complete the data necessary to carry out the needed analyses.
The sample selected for this study consists of the 5,225 individuals who were 65 or older in the beginning months of the panel.* The SIPP data have been used fairly extensively to examine wealth and in come stams (Radner 1987) and changes over time (David and Fitzger ald 1986) , poverty status and dynamics (Ruggles 1987; Hanushek and Williams 1985; Williams 1986) , and program participation (Doyle and Long 1988) . In this study we take a somewhat different approach and look specifically at the protection provided by program eligibility rela tive to expected catastrophic needs.
Sources of Economic Insecurity
The five specific sources o f economic insecurity among the middleincome elderly that we consider most crucial to their economic vulnera bility are interrelated but separable:
1. Medicare as the only acute health-insurance subsidy (or, in very rare cases, reliance on no health insurance at all) 2. Insufficient financial resources to cover two years (the median length of stay) in a long-term-care facility 3. Ineligibility for SSI even if all income other than Social Security should cease 4. Housing costs as a percent o f income above the accepted maximum 5. Higher costs of living due to one or more sources of physical disability
A c u t e H e a lth (M ed ica l) C are
The two largest sources o f nonmoney income among the elderly arc housing and health-care benefits (Smeeding 1989 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988a). Food stamps are important to the poorest elderly, but they are dominated by Medicare, Medicaid, and other health-care sub sidies, and by public housing and implicit rent on owner-occupied homes. The level and distribution of each of these types of benefits are crucial to alleviating the insecurities facing the elderly. We deal with acute health care first, then chronic health-care needs, and finally housing.
Overall expenditures on acute health care for the elderly (excluding long-term care) reached $4,200 per person by 1984 (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) . O f this total, the elderly paid about 36 percent out of pocket, either directly or via private health-insurance premiums (Gordon 1986 ). In 1961, before Medicare, the income share spent on medical care by the elderly was no higher than 11 percent, even at poverty-line income levels. Paradoxically, while a larger proportion of the medicalcare outlays o f the elderly are now covered by subsidized insurance plans, out-of-pocket health-care expenditures for the old reached 15 percent o f elderly household income in 1984 -and continue to rise (Gordon 1986 ). The variance in out-of-pocket expenditures across the income spectrum is also now larger. In 1984 the poor and near poor spent over 16 percent o f income (although Medicaid helped the poorest of these) while the richest 20 percent of elderly families spent less than 2 percent of their incomes on health care that year (Moon 1983) . About 12 per cent of the elderly spent 20 percent or more of their incomes on acute-health-care out-of-pocket costs in 1984 (Feder, Moon, and Scanlon 1987) .
Virtually everyone among the elderly has Medicare (Smeeding and Straub 1987) . While Medicare covered 69 percent of all doctor and hos pital bills, it paid less than 44 percent of the total health-care outlays of the elderly in 1984. The rest was covered by Medicaid, the U.S. Vet erans Administration, or by employer subsidies for retiree health-care insurance. The important question, then, is what else elderly individu als have to help cover the 56 percent of total health-care costs that Medicare does n ot cover? Persons now burdened with high medical outlays relative to income have either high acute or chronic medical needs or are paying hefty private supplemental insurance (medigap) premiums to protect them at least partially against these exigencies. Those who escape these burdens, and who are thus more secure, either have high enough incomes to cover medical costs, or have an additional form of health-insurance subsidy (beyond Medicare) to help purchase adequate coverage. This added subsidy can take three forms: Medicaid, VA health coverage, or employer-subsidized health insurance. Those with the first two added subsidies are protected against the cost of al most every medical contingency, including nursing-home care. These programs cover the poor (Medicaid) and elderly male veterans at virtu ally all income levels (VA health care). Those with employer-subsidized insurance tend to have broad and substantial coverage, including not only Medicare deductibles and coinsurance, but also benefits not cov ered by Medicare.
Those without such subsidies must either rely on Medicare alone or purchase largely substandard supplementary insurance with their own funds. Although researchers have shown that this Medicare-only elderly group has fewer visits to doctors, fewer hospital stays, and buys fewer dmgs than do other elderly, lower utilization is due primarily to finan cial barriers to care and not to better health status (Berk and Wilensky 1983) . So, lack of any health-insurance subsidy beyond Medicare is a sign of economic insecurity due to risk of high medical bills and possi bly even medical economic catastrophe.
We define those at risk due to inadequate health-insurance protec tion against high acute-care out-of-pocket expenditures as those repott ing no employer-subsidized health insurance and who ate eligible for neither VA care nor Medicaid. VA eligibility is inferred from SIPP data on locus of care, VA insurance coverage, VA disability ratings, and reported service disability and injury. Medicaid eligibility is as sumed for all SSI recipients and eligibles, where eligibility is estimated using federal rules applicable in 1984. Note that some SSI eligibles may reside with noneligible relatives (and thus may be found in nonpoor families), although SSI benefits will be reduced in such cases. Table 1 shows the elderly individuals in our SIPP sample who are at risk of high acute-care out-of-pocket expenditures, ranked by welfare ratio. Individuals are ranked by family poverty status; money income here and in the remainder of this article includes reported gross cash income plus the cash value of food stamps. (Income is not adjusted for payroll, income, and property taxes.) We find that 51 percent of the lower-middle-income group (welfare ratio of 1.0 to 1.99) is at risk for high acute-health-care bills compared with 28 percent of the poor and 40 percent of the higher-income group (welfare ratio 2.0 or higher). Medicaid eligibility removes 58 percent of the poor from being at risk, but only 17 percent of the lower middle class. Veteran's care removes an additional 22 percent of those at risk (all males) from the pool. The additional impact o f employersubsidized insurance is decidedly tilted in favor of the middle and up per classes as expected.
The R isk o f C h ro n ic H ea lth -ca re E x p e n se s As Rice and Gabel (1987) have recently argued, nursing-home and re lated long-term-care costs are responsible for the largest share of out-ofpocket health-care costs for the elderly population. For those facing out-of-pocket medical bills of more than $2,000 in 1986, over 80 per cent of those outlays were for nursing-home care. Nursing-home costs in 1984 averaged about $1,500 per month or $18,000 per year (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) . Although nursing-home stays vary significantly in length, Moon and Smeeding (1989) argue that the average period of stay for all but short-stay (less than three months) patients is just over 2.0 years. Hence, we might use 2.0 years of cost or $36,000 in 1984 as our criterion of adequacy against nursing-home protection. Those with less than this amount o f protection could be deemed to be at risk of catastrophic outlays for long-term-care costs. Kemper and Murtaugh (1989) report that although 37 percent of the elderly will be institutionalized at least once, the chance of being in stitutionalized for over two years o f one's remaining lifetime at age 65 is about 14 percent for today's elderly. But the chance is 20 percent for women, compared with 7 percent for men. Hence sufficient assets and/or income to cover two years o f nursing-home care would protect 6 out of 7 elderly persons: 4 of 5 women and more than 12 o f 13 men.
What resources should be counted against this potential cost? The answer to this question is not simple, particularly for elderly couples. In order to meet the cost of long-term care, both assets and incomes can be used. But to what extent can a single elderly person rely on home-equity conversion to liquidate part of their home? How much in come (and assets) can an elderly man (woman) use without impoverish ing his (her) spouse? How plentiful and prevalent are whole or term life-insurance policies on elderly adults, especially male spouses? Al though no one has firm answers to these questions, recent data from the Congressional Research Service using the 1984 SIPP data (House Ways and Means Committee 1988, table 22, p. 746) shown in table 2 indicate that median total net worth among the elderly, even those 85 or over, could pay for two years or more of nursing care. But excluding home equity, the median net worth of remaining (mainly financial) as sets of the elderly is n ot enough to assure more than one year of nursing-home costs ($18,000) for those aged 65 to 79, and less than that for those 80 and over.
We experimented with several options and report on three here. The basic assumption made in all simulations is that an individual not al ready eligible for Medicaid is at risk if sufficient assets are not available to cover the cost of a median (two-year) nursing-home stay. A single individual is considered at risk if assets, including his or her home, are valued at less than $36,000 in 1984. A couple, on the other hand, may have sufficient assets for the care of one spouse, but in paying nursinghome costs could exhaust those needed in the future by the other, leaving the survivor at risk.^ We consider both spouses at risk if liquid assets would not cover the nursing-home (or equivalent at-home care) costs of the husband and would leave the wife with insufficient assets (including her home and the face value o f any life insurance held by her husband) to cover an equivalent stay for herself. The implication is that the wife of a couple is at risk (the wife, because she is most likely 
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to be the survivor) if his care "eats" into her ability to finance her own long-term health care. The second simulation is based on the same division of assets as is the first, but deems only the wife at risk if her husband's health-care costs require depletion of her remaining assets below the prescribed level. The husband is not at risk in the sense that his care costs will be provided by his spouse or eventual Medicaid eligibility, requiring no change in his nursing-home care. His "community spouse" will be the one who suffers from a sharp diminution in available assets to finance her consumption. The data in Kemper and Murtaugh (1989) seem to support this treatment. Whereas the wife has a 20 percent chance of a greater than two-year stay, the man's chances are only 7 percent. The joint probability that both would need a stay of more than two years is only 14 percent.
This second simulation can also be compared with the distribution of risk if the spousal impoverishment provisions of the Catastrophic Health Care Act of 1988 had been in place in 1984 (U.S. Congres sional Budget Office 1988). This bill specified a division of the non home assets of a couple such that, until a specified level (at least $12,000 of assets) is allocated to the community spouse, none can be deemed to the institutionalized spouse. We simulate this division of as sets for out sample, but assume that only up to $36,000 will be spent on an institutionalized husband, with the rest inherited by the wife for her eventual needs.
The first definition o f risk resulted in 31 percent of the poor, 53 per cent of the lower middle class, and 33 percent o f the remaining being at risk (table 3, row 1). Counting only wives to be at risk-the second definition of risk (row 2) -reduced the percentage in all income groups, but by more in the higher-income group where women and men are more likely to be married and, if married, to have younger (nonsample) spouses.
The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Catastrophic bill are all that remain from that legislation. We simulate those provisions (row 3) because they are in fact current policy and because some states are taking similar approaches to dealing with spousal impoverishment due to long-term-care costs. However, the provision has only a modest im pact in all three age groups, with individuals in the upper income group disproportionately benefited. This is due to the fact that wivesand not single individuals-benefit and married women are more likely than single women to have higher family income. In addition, only couples with as. ts to divide can benefit, and a high proportion of those at risk cannot finance even one year of nursing-home care out of their combined assets. Thus, whereas only 42 percent of the at-risk group has income greater than two times the poverty threshold, twothirds of the women who gain (row 5) or are moved out of risk (row 6) by this provision are in this category.
We adopt the second, more conservative definition of risk in our ba sic simulations. We do not use the first definition, which would leave a greater number insecure. Table 4 shows the protection provided against long-term-care risks-and conversely the reasons those at risk
The Insecure Elderly Caught in Between X 0 3 are so disadvantaged. Asset sufficiency was the major cause of not be ing at risk for all but the poor, for whom Medicaid eligibility or re ceipt was the major factor that eliminated them from this insecurity (table 4).
Social Security (O A Sl)
Among the various sources of income of the elderly, the one thought to be most secure is Social Security (or Old Age and Survivors Insur ance [OASI] ). However, for some elderly beneficiaries these relatively fixed benefits, which change only with prices, are paradoxically a source of insecurity if other types of incomes fall. For the very poor elderly, SSI reduces the insecurity (although obviously not the inadequacy) of other sources of income because in the event of a change in non-OASI income or some other unmet need, those eligible for SSI would be compensated by increased SSI benefits. For example, if income should fall because interest-bearing assets are depleted to pay high out-ofpocket medical-care costs, or because disability causes cessation of parttime work, SSI would compensate for some o f that fall, and more important, confer Medicaid eligibility. But for some poor and most of the near poor, their heavy dependence on "secure" OASI signals that there is little -including SSI -on which the individual could draw in case of unexpected income needs. Table 5 shows the degree to which elderly individuals in our SIPP sample are dependent on OASI. The first panel shows that the over whelming share of income for those with incomes below poverty and those in the lower-middle-income range comes from OASI. OASI ac counts for at least 65 percent of income of 68 percent of the poor and 64 percent of the lower-middle-income group. In comparison, only 12 percent o f those in the higher-income group depend on OASI for 65 percent or more o f their income. OASI secures a substantial share of the income of these individuals. Among the poor, almost half of those who are dependent on OASI are currently either recipients or eligible for SSI (second panel). For them, unexpected changes in other income would be offset by increases in SSI. But for almost all of those who are not now eligible for SSI (and Medicaid), the third panel shows that SSI is unlikely ever to be an option under current rules. Their OASI benefits alone would make them ineligible. These individuals would be eligible for Medicaid only if deemed "medically needy" and allowed to "spend down" in the states with such an option. Among the lower-middle-income group an even higher percentage (54 percent) are dependent on OASI and nei ther currently eligible for SSI nor eligible if all other sources of income ceased.
Based on these considerations, we define those at risk due to overdependence on OASI to be those with more than 65 percent of total income from OASI and who would not be eligible for SSI based on OASI alone. Insecurity comes from inability to qualify for SSI if other income sources fall, and so for this condition we evaluate SSI eligibility on the basis of OASI benefits alone. (Note we do not allow earners to be at risk because they may not be collecting full OASI pension bene fits.) Table 6 indicates that 54 percent of the lower middle class fall into this category compared with 34 percent o f the poor and only 10 percent of the higher welfare ratio group. Actual and potential SSI eligibility buttresses the poor elderly who are dependent on OASI (29 percent), but has only a minor impact on the remaining groups.
Housing Costs
The role of housing in generating nonmoney income is very important to the elderly. Over 80 percent of all elderly households, and almost 90 percent of all elderly couples, receive some form of housing income in kind, which shields them from substantial rental housing costs or unex pected change in those costs (Smeeding 1986 ). Over 75 percent of the elderly own their own homes; about three-quarters of these have no mortgage owing. While owning one's home outright still leaves open the possibility of economic vulnerability to upkeep, rising utility bills, or property taxes, other housing costs are virtually zero.
Benefits from public housing reached 40 percent of all elderly poor Because public-housing rents rarely exceed 25 percent of net cash income, and because living rent free means zero rent, these renters are significandy better off than those who pay full market rent in an unsubsidized dwelling. Although the latter may apply for housing subsidies, waiting lists in most areas are long and for the nonpoor income may be too high to meet state-determined eligibility standards.
Since 1979, home ownership among the elderly has risen slighdy with the average equity in owned homes. The median value of net worth in one's own home in 1984, reflected in the SIPP database that we use in this article, was more than $30,000. Income in kind from owned homes, which comes in the form of "implicit" rent, averaged near $1,100 per year among elderly homeowners in 1979 (Smeeding 1989a) and $3,120 in 1986 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988a). Al though the asset value of owned homes may (or may not; see Vend and Wise 1989) be an important source of funds in time of need (e.g., via a reverse annuity mortgage [RAM] ), the important point to note at this juncture is the substantial added in-kind income that accnies to owner occupiers from implicit rent.
Still, even homeowners may face property tax bills (net of local circuit-breaker rebates), utilities, and mortgages, which force them to pay an inordinately large share of their incomes for shelter costs. In 1984, only 6 percent of all owners paid more than one-third of their money income for shelter costs. But even among these, high housing costs might be a matter of choice, not necessity. In other words, among owners already in jeopardy due to high housing costs-those who are tmly at risk because they have no alternatives -are those whose home equity is also below some minimum amount. For such persons, selling the home would put them at risk in the rental market but yield them only a small net gain in assets.
To summarize, housing costs among unsubsidized elderly renters are generally higher and definitely more volatile than those facing elderly owners or subsidized renters. The unsubsidized renter is thus presented with economic vulnerability to both rents and rising utility bills as well as a substantially higher real cost of living. On these grounds we argue that households with no in-kind housing income from implicit rent or public housing are vulnerable to high housing costs and that these costs are a source of economic insecurity. To these we would add homeown ers who have below $36,000 in net equity and are already paying more than 33 percent of their incomes for housing costs. Subsidized renters are at least partially protected by their subsidy arrangements, while elderly homeowners not burdened by high costs and low equity are also enjoying the advantage of their home as an asset per se.
Those at risk due to being market renters or spending a large frac tion of income on a low-equity home were 35 percent of the poor, 24 percent of the lower-middle-class group, but only 13 percent of the re mainder (table 7, row 5). As expected, ownership of housing that did not requite excessive shelter costs eliminated the largest percentage from the at-risk category (row 3). Public housing and living rent free are important among the poor especially, but also among the lower middle class. Among those at risk for housing costs, most were full market renters, and more likely to be in poverty where home owner ship is less likely. But still, among the poor, half of those at risk (18 percent of all elderly living in poverty) were so classified because as owners they spent more than 33 percent of their incomes on a home that had a net equity value of less than $36,000. At risk are full market renters and those owners with less than $36,000 in housing equity who are spending greater than 33% of income on housing costs.
H ealth a n d Functionality
The major definitional criteria for the insecure have so far been eco nomic in nature. But the physical needs of elderly people can affect well-being and security in both economic and noneconomic ways. Re cent research (Manton 1987; Kovar 1987; Harris 1987) indicates that many elderly persons, particularly those aged 75 and over who are liv ing in the community, have chronic disabilities and significant diffi culty in performing the usual activities of daily living (eating, bathing, moving about, etc.). For those people, insecurity comes not only from financial factors, but also from the fear of being unable to function in dependently. Moreover, the home-based elderly with functional dis abilities also face greater time and money costs in performing usual tasks such as shopping, cooking, and cleaning. For these persons, the extra unsubsidized costs of home and neighborhood help can reduce their economic as well as their physical well-being.
Physical insecurity can thus compound the economic disaster from high acute-care medical bills or long-term care costs. Disability reduces the ability of individuals to adjust through behavioral changes to such disasters, and, more seriously, are likely to increase the likelihood and the duration of costly medical care.
Of the five chronic disability items in SIPP, we counted as disabled those suffering from one or more of the following three limitations of daily activities:
1. Need help of another person to get in or out of bed 2. Need help in preparing meals or to do housework 3. Need assistance in looking after personal needs such as eating, dressing, or personal hygiene This resulted in 16 percent of the elderly being classified as disabled (table 8) , with higher proportions disabled among the poor and in the lower-middle-income group. About half of all individuals with at least one disability had another as well.
Results
Having determined the number of elderly families (or persons) in each of the five at-risk situations, the calculation of the multiple incidence of these sources of insecurity is straightforward. Although facing only one of these five conditions would not signal economic insecurity, com binations of these conditions (e.g., two or more) will almost surely cre ate an insecure and unstable economic state for affected households. The presence of a large fraction of the elderly facing potentially high acute medical-care costs without medical insurance beyond Medicare and modest assets is not consistent with reports in the literature of the well-off elderly household.
Those subject to three of five sources of insecurity are also high- lighted. We call these the extremely insecure. Typically, they will be unable to cover high acute medical-care costs either by subsidized in surance (beyond Medicare), their own assets, or by spending down to Medicaid eligibility limits. Approximately one in three elderly persons (35.5 percent of all peo ple 65 and over) faced at least two sources of insecurity. But of those living in the lower-middle-income range, two in three (60.8 percent) were subject to at least two of the sources of economic insecurity. Even among the poor, 43 percent faced these same insecurities, in conuast to only 22 percent of the higher income group.
The bottom half of table 9 shows those who are extremely insecure, facing three or more sources of economic risk. They total more than one-quarter of the lower middle class, and smaller proportions of the poor and upper middle class.
Who should be protected against sources of insecurities is a major social issue. Political and financial constraints on the ability of the gov ernment to extend benefits to all the aged would dictate less concern for those in higher income groups who are insecure. Their higher in- comes by definition enable them better to withstand financial exigen cies. The 43 percent of the poor who are so situated are of greater policy concern. Under 1984 rules and regulations, these persons were income and/or asset ineligible for SSI and Medicaid. However, some steps have been taken since that time to reduce economic insecurity among the poor elderly who find themselves at risk. Although the na tional SSI income guarantee has not yet risen to the poverty line, it has increased faster than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) during the Rea gan era. Moreover, the Catastrophic Health Care Act of 1988, even as amended in 1989, extends acute health-care coverage to all of the poor. Ironically, because these efforts concentrate only on the poor, they make the contrast with the insecure who live just above the poverty line even more stark. Inflating these numbers, based on SIPP sample weights up to 1984 population estimates, we find 4.5 million elderly individuals in the insecure lower-middle-income level -these are the 'tweeners identified by Smeeding (1986) . This is probably an underestimate because we ex cluded from our sample individuals who failed to respond to the survey over a full calendar-year period. These can be compared with the 3.3 million elderly officially counted as poor in 1984 and the 2.4 million poor represented by our sample. O f the 'tweeners, 2.1 million, more than 45 percent, are extremely insecure. These can be compared with the 1.6 million elderly whom the Census Bureau classifies as poor after counting noncash benefits, including implicit rent, as income (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). In fact, then, economic insecurity among the elderly in the United States today is a problem of greater magn itude than is poverty status.
The prevalence of each source of insecurity among the 'tweenersthe insecure in the lower-middle-income range-is shown in table 10. The two most prevalent sources were lack of protection through subsi dized insurance against acute health-care costs and heavy reliance on Social Security for over 65 percent of income, but ineligible based on that income alone for SSI. These were followed by exposure to chroniccare costs and finally by housing and disability. The three most preva lent sources of insecurity demonstrate the jeopardy faced by individuals due to the lack in the United States of universal access to broad health care coverage.
The demographic composition of the 'tweeners is shown in table 11. The 18.4 percent of all elderly persons who are tweeners arc more likely to be female, disabled, over 75, or unmarried, as compared with the entire elderly population. This is a group that -as suggested in the scenario at the beginning of the article-is least likely to be able to re cover from a health and financial crisis.
Summary and Policy Implications
Whereas the overall data on elderly poverty and income levels indicate an increasingly better-off elderly population, static poverty data do not reflect the economic insecurity the elderly face owing to the inadequacy of resources to meet highly probable events. Almost one-fifth of all elderly, and over one-quarter of all single persons aged 75 and over in 1984 were living with cash incomes between the poverty line and twice the poverty line, and were subject to two or more conditions of eco nomic insecurity related to poor health-insurance protection, risk of destitution for a nursing-home stay, chronic disabilities, high housing costs, or inability to qualify for SSI because of high and relatively sta ble OASI income. These insecure elderly totaled 60.8 percent of the elderly living on incomes between 1.0 and 2.0 times the poverty line. Much smaller fractions of the poor and the higher income group suffered from two of these five conditions of insecurity. Some of the poor may be in poverty because they have already suf fered the events we define as potential sources of insecurity; with SIPP data it is impossible to discover for how many this may be the case. There is no doubt that their current resources may be sorely inadequate to meet current consumption needs. But looking at another dimension of well-being, their current insecurity is diminished by their nearness to the income thresholds at which the means-tested safety net kicks in. Likewise, the higher-income insecure may also be moving down the eco nomic ladder as realized sources of insecurity diminish their resources. But the snapshot provided by the 1984 panel of SIPP indicates their having the wherewithal to better sustain these contingencies.
Simultaneously high average total incomes, relatively low poverty rates, and significant numbers of insecure among the elderly are not contradictory. In general, tax and transfer policy benefits the elderly much more than any other group. Virtually all elderly benefit from OASI and Medicare. In addition, the poor receive substantial meanstested and cash-in-kind transfers while the well-to-do receive enough additional subsidies and tax-free income to leave them better off after government intervention than before it. Among the lower-middleincome elderly, the insecure basically get OASI and Medicare. Other than these benefits, the nonmoney income system has largely passed them by. They are more likely to rent unsubsidized private dwellings, less likely to have non-Medicare health-care subsidies, more likely to rely on OASI as the primary source of their incomes than are any other group.
Several features of the (1988) Catastrophic Health Care Act were de signed to reduce the insecurity of the elderly from large long-term health-care bills, which is the primary source of insecurity among the 'rweeners. Most provisions were repealed (e.g., 150 days of nursinghome care without prior hospitalization), but the features of spousal impoverishment and low-income protection via Medicaid payment of Medicare premia for poor elderly were retained. The spousal impover ishment provision of the Catastrophic Act provides a more liberal exclusion of assets in the case of married couples where one needs med ical or nursing-home care, thus increasing the Medicaid eligibility of the institutionalized spouse. But we have shown that the spousal im poverishment provision reduces the total number of insecure by very little. The reason is that the insecure are less likely to be married and, even if married, to have assets sufficient for the surviving spouse to gain substantially. Ironically, the division o f assets in favor of the com munity spouse reduces her Medicaid eligibility, even if income eligible.
The institutionalized spouse may be Medicaid eligible, but the low fed eral asset limits means that community spouses are less likely to be. The largest numbers of gainers are among those with higher assets to begin with, and they are much less likely to be subject to any of our defined sources of insecurity.
The Catastrophic Act's provision that Medicaid coverage of Medicare cost sharing be extended to all persons below the poverty threshold does reduce the percentage of poor who are at risk for large hospital and physician bills (from 35 to 26 percent). But the number subject to two or more risks in the lower-middle-income category does not, of course, change at all.
The small net effect o f this legislation on the at-risk group only reiterates our point: The insecure near poor are not poor enough to benefit from the Medicaid extension, but neither do they have su ffi cient assets (or are they enough married) to gain from the spousal im poverishment provisions. Hence the provisions rem aining from the Catastrophic Act do little for the majority o f the insecure. I f Congress reconsiders this piece o f legislation, it m ight do well to consider ways to target the most insecure elderly-those who are just barely nonpoor. Until such policy changes are enacted, we will find that although the 'tweeners by definition have more money income than the poor-and therefore are better off in this sense -they also face a significantly greater degree of economic uncertainty that should be accounted for by policy makers. The provisions of the current Catastrophic Act only make this difference more striking. Soldo and Longino (1985) predict that, absent any change in the current policy mix.
[the] public sector will continue to focus on the needs of the eco nomically most vulnerable and the private sector on those of the eco nomically most adequate, both sectors inching gradually toward the x i 6 socioeconomic middle, as the political and economic climates per mit. The future of the very old who are economically positioned in the center will continue to have the least resources available to them, as they do now.
Hence near poverty is likely to remain associated with insecurity. Un less deliberate policy action is taken to alleviate the insecurities of the lower middle class, the economically insecure 20 percent of the elderly whom we call the 'tweeners will circumstantially remain just about where they are today: caught in the middle.
Noteŝ
Individuals must have been at least 65 in either wave 2 or 3, the first inter view from which wc gather income data. Because we use an annual income measure of household welfare, each individual must have remained in the sam ple for three consecutive waves. We gathered data from the early waves of SIPP in order to have concurrent data on income, health and medical insurance sta tus (wave 3), and assets (wave 4) and to minimize sample reduction due to at trition. Asset data are also available from wave 7, but these are for up to one year after the time to which health and medical insurance data refer. When married, the individual's spouse's income and assets will be counted in estimat ing household income and assets (and hence the individual's economic vulnera bility), but only if the spouse is also over 64 will he or she be included in the sample.
We make the assumption that only if the spouse is also in the sample can his or her risk trigger a risk to the other spouse. Thus, even if the costs of health care for the in-sample spouse drasticdly reduce the assets of a younger spouse, the couple is not considered at risk. Only if there are insufficient liquid assets to cover the nursing-home fees of the in-sample spouse will that spouse be considered at risk. This implies that the younger spouse has other resources that arc yet untapped to finance his or her older years.
